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Public policy debates and theoretical disputes motivate this paper’s ex-
amination of the relationship between bank concentration and banking
system fragility and the mechanisms underlying this relationship. The
rapid consolidation of banks around the world is intensifying concerns
among policymakers about bank concentration, as reﬂected in major
reports by the Bank for International Settlements (2001), International
Monetary Fund (2001), and the Group of Ten (2001). These reports note
that concentration may reduce competition in and access to ﬁnancial ser-
vices, increase the market power and political inﬂuence of ﬁnancial con-
glomerates, and destabilize ﬁnancial systems as banks become too big to
discipline and use their inﬂuence to shape banking regulations and poli-
cies. These reports also provide countervailing arguments. Consolidation
may improve banking system eﬃciency and enhance stability as the best
banks succeed, diversify, and boost franchise value. Further, some may
question whether bank concentration is a reliable indicator of competition
in the banking industry.
Theoretical disputes parallel these public policy deliberations. Some
models yield a “concentration-stability” prediction that banking system
concentration reduces fragility (Allen and Gale 2000, 2003). In terms of
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We received very helpful comments from John Boyd, Maria Carkovic, George Clarke, Gi-
anni DeNicolo, Peter Garber, and seminar participants at the University of Minnesota, the
World Bank, and the NBER Conference on the Risks of Financial Institutions. This paper’s
ﬁndings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily represent the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they rep-
resent.mechanisms, concentration may signal less competition and hence greater
market power and proﬁts. Higher proﬁts provide a buﬀer against adverse
shocks and increase the franchise value of the bank, which reduces incen-
tives for bankers to take excessive risk.1 Also, some hold that it is substan-
tially easier for supervisors to monitor a few banks in a concentrated bank-
ing system than it is to monitor lots of banks in a diﬀuse banking system,
so that in equilibrium, concentrated banking systems will suﬀer fewer
banking crises. Some proponents of the “concentration-stability” view note
that if (1) concentrated banking systems have larger banks and (2) larger
banks hold more diversiﬁed portfolios than smaller banks, then concen-
trated banking systems will tend to be more stable.2
In contrast, some models produce a “concentration-fragility” predic-
tion, where concentration increases fragility. Boyd and De Nicoló (2005)
stress that banks in less competitive environments charge higher interest
rates to ﬁrms, which induces ﬁrms to assume greater risk. Their model pre-
dicts that if concentration is positively associated with banks having mar-
ket power, then concentration will increase both the expected rate of return
on bank assets and the standard deviation of those returns. Also, propo-
nents of the concentration-fragility view disagree with the proposition that
a few large banks are easier to monitor than many small banks. If size is
positively correlated with complexity, then large banks may be more diﬃ-
cult to monitor than small banks, not less. Finally, some researchers argue
that larger banks are protected by implicit “too-big-to-fail” policies that
small banks do not enjoy. This protection intensiﬁes risk-taking incentives
beyond any diversiﬁcation advantages enjoyed by large banks (Boyd and
Runkle 1993; Mishkin 1999; O’Hara and Shaw 1990).3 From this perspec-
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1. See Boot and Greenbaum (1993), Besanko and Thakor (1993), Hellman, Murdoch, and
Stiglitz (2000), and Matutes and Vives (2000). Also, Smith (1984) shows that less competition
in banking leads to more stability if information about the probability distribution of depos-
itors’ liquidity needs is private and lower competition allows banking relationships to endure
for longer periods. Matutes and Vives (1996), however, argue that concentration is not a con-
sistent signal of competition, so that bank illiquidity can arise in any market structure.
2. Each of these conditions is debatable. Models by Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and
Thakor (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Williamson (1986), Allen (1990), and others pre-
dict economies of scale in intermediation. As discussed by Calomiris (2000) and Calomiris
and Mason (2000), research ﬁnds an inverse relationship between bank size and bank failure
in the United States. However, Chong (1991) and Hughes and Mester (1998) indicate that
bank consolidation tends to increase the risk of bank portfolios. Moreover, Boyd and Runkle
(1993) examine 122 U.S. bank holding companies and ﬁnd an inverse relationship between
size and the volatility of assets returns, but not evidence that large banks fail less frequently
than small banks. In contrast, De Nicoló (2000) ﬁnds a positive relationship between bank
size and the probability that the bank will fail in the United States, Japan, and several Euro-
pean countries. We control for bank size in our regressions, but the focus of our research is
on the relationship between the concentration and fragility of national banking systems.
3. A large literature indicates that implicit or explicit deposit insurance creates incentives
for banks to increase risk (e.g., Merton 1977, Sharpe 1978, Flannery 1989, Kane 1989, and
Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor 1992). If this insurance were the same for banks of all sizes,
these models would predict no relationship between bank size and bank fragility. Since regu-tive, concentrated banking systems with a few large banks will tend to be
more fragile than diﬀuse banking system with many small banks.
Given these conﬂicting theoretical predictions and policy disputes, there
are surprisingly few cross-country examinations of banking system con-
centration and fragility.4 Although there is a growing cross-country empir-
ical literature that uses time series data to examine the determinants of
banking crises, this research does not examine concentration (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache 1998, 1999, henceforth DD; Gonzalez-Hermosillo,
Pazarbasioglu, and Billings 1997; Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). Al-
though Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) examine the relationship between
bank regulations and crises, they do not examine bank concentration, and
they use pure cross-country comparisons rather than panel analyses. De
Nicoló et al. (2003) ﬁnd a positive relationship between banking system
concentration and the fragility of the largest ﬁve banks in a country. They
do not, however, examine systemic crises.
This paper (1) assesses the relationship between bank concentration and
the probability that a country will suﬀer a systemic crisis and (2) provides
evidence on whether particular hypothesized mechanisms linking concen-
tration and fragility—competition, diversiﬁcation, and the ease of moni-
toring—account for the identiﬁed relationship between concentration and
stability. We focus on these three mechanisms because of their prominence
in policy and academic discussions.
To investigate systemic crises, we use annual data on sixty-nine countries
over the period 1980–1997. While no single, unambiguous deﬁnition of a
systemic crisis exists, we use the DD (2002) classiﬁcation and conﬁrm the
results with other deﬁnitions. DD (2002) consider a country to be in a sys-
temic crisis if (1) authorities use emergency measures, such as bank holi-
days, deposit freezes, blanket guarantees, and so forth to assist the bank-
ing industry, (2) countries undertake large-scale nationalizations of banks,
(3) nonperforming loans top 10 percent of total banking assets, or (4) the ﬁs-
cal costs of rescue operations exceed two percent of Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP). Using logit regressions, we analyze the association between
banking system concentration and the probability that a country experi-
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lators may fear potential macroeconomic consequences of large bank failures, many coun-
tries have implicit “too-large-to-fail” policies that protect large banks more than small banks.
Thus, the largest banks frequently receive a greater net insurance subsidy from the govern-
ment. This subsidy may in turn increase the risk-taking incentives of the larger banks more
than smaller banks. For an analysis of the corporate governance of banks, see Macey and
O’Hara (2003). Note, however, that even in the absence of deposit insurance, banks are prone
to excessive risk taking due to limited liability for their equity holders and to their high lever-
age (Stiglitz 1972).
4. For the United States, Keeley (1990) provides evidence that increased competition fol-
lowing the relaxation of state branching restrictions in the 1980s increased the risk of large
banks. However, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) ﬁnd that deregulation in the 1980s lowered
loan losses, and Dick (2006) ﬁnds higher loan loss provisions following deregulation in the
1990s.ences a systemic crisis. In the analyses we condition on many country char-
acteristics, including bank supervisory and regulatory practices, institu-
tional development, and macroeconomic controls, such as the level of eco-
nomic development, economic growth, inﬂation, interest rates, terms of
trade changes, and credit growth.
The results are inconsistent with the concentration-fragility view. We do
not ﬁnd a positive relationship between banking system concentration and
the likelihood that the country suﬀers a systemic crisis. Using diﬀerent con-
ditioning information sets, diﬀerent sample periods, diﬀerent deﬁnitions of
crises, and diﬀerent measures of concentration, we never ﬁnd a signiﬁcant,
positive link between concentration and crises. Thus, our analyses lend no
support to the view that concentration increases the fragility of banks.
Rather, the ﬁndings are broadly consistent with the concentration-
stability view. Concentration enters the crises regressions negatively and sig-
niﬁcantly across a wide array of speciﬁcations. Thus, although we will em-
phasize numerous qualiﬁcations, the data consistently indicate a positive
relationship between national bank concentration and banking system
stability.
Furthermore, we provide exploratory evidence on the potential mecha-
nisms—competition, diversiﬁcation, and ease of monitoring—underlying
the positive relationship between concentration and stability. First, to as-
sess whether concentration proxies for competition, we include bank regu-
latory indicators and measures of national institutional development.
More speciﬁcally, we control for national policies toward bank entry, bank
activities, and bank ownership, as well as several indicators of national in-
stitutions that aﬀect competition. If (1) these variables measure the com-
petitive environment in banking and (2) concentration proxies for com-
petition, then including these variables should eliminate the signiﬁcance 
of concentration in the fragility regressions. Moreover, these assessments
provide independently valuable information on the linkages between
banking system fragility and bank regulations. Second, to assess whether
concentration proxies for diversiﬁcation or ease of monitoring, we include
numerous indicators that attempt to proxy for these mechanisms. For di-
versiﬁcation, we control for (a) the size of the economy, which may corre-
late positively with the ability of banks to diversify domestically, (b) re-
strictions on making loans abroad, which may correlate negatively with the
ability of banks to diversify internationally, and (c) mean bank size, which
some argue is positively correlated with diversiﬁcation. For ease of moni-
toring, we control for (a) the number of banks, (b) regulatory restrictions
on banks’ ability to engage in nonlending services, since the complexity of
banks may hinder monitoring, (c) mean bank size, since larger banks may
be more complex than smaller banks, (d) capital regulatory requirements,
deposit insurance, and other prudential regulations, and (e) the average
cash ﬂow rights of the controlling owner, if any, of the largest, listed banks
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ern the bank eﬀectively. Again, if including these variables eliminates the
relationship between concentration and fragility, then this provides cir-
cumstantial evidence that concentration acts as a proxy for diversiﬁcation
or the cost of monitoring banks.
In terms of regulatory policies and institutional development, we ﬁnd
that (1) fewer regulatory restrictions on banks—lower barriers to bank
entry, fewer restrictions on bank activities, and fewer impediments to bank
operations in general—reduce banking system fragility, and (2) countries
with national institutions that foster competition have lower banking sys-
tem fragility. Thus, policies and institutions that facilitate competition in
banking are associated with less—not more—banking system fragility.
Furthermore, capital requirements, reserve requirements, and prudential
regulations do not aﬀect the results on concentration and, interestingly, do
not reduce the likelihood of suﬀering a systemic crisis. Regarding speciﬁc
mechanisms associated with the concentration-stability view, the ﬁndings
that (1) banking system concentration is associated with lowerfragility and
(2) policies that foster competition are associated with lower fragility sug-
gest that concentration is proxying for something else besides a lack of
competition.
In terms of diversiﬁcation, we ﬁnd some support for the view that one of
the mechanisms underlying the negative relationship between concentra-
tion and banking system fragility is that concentrated banking systems
tend to have larger, better-diversiﬁed banks. While recognizing that the
measures of diversiﬁcation are both indirect and potentially imprecise, we
ﬁnd that controlling for proxies of diversiﬁcation substantially reduces the
ties between concentration and crises. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that (1)
controlling for the size of the domestic economy eliminates the connection
between concentration and systemic crises, (2) controlling for the mean
size of banks weakens the link between concentration and crises, and (3)
controlling for mean bank size and restrictions on foreign loans eliminates
the negative relationship between banking system concentration and the
probability of suﬀering a systemic crisis. The results are consistent with ar-
guments that countries with, on average, larger banks tend to have a lower
likelihood of suﬀering a systemic crisis and inconsistent with the view that
large banks distort public policies in a manner that increases banking sys-
tem fragility.
In contrast, we ﬁnd no support for any of the views suggesting that con-
centration is a proxy for the degree of diﬃculty in monitoring banks. When
controlling for the number of banks, or regulatory restrictions on banks, or
capital requirements, or prudential regulations, or the cash ﬂow rights of
the bank’s controlling owner (if any), this does not change the ﬁnding of 
a negative relationship between concentration and crises. In sum, we did
not ﬁnd much support that a distinguishing characteristic of concentrated
Bank Concentration and Fragility 197banking systems is that they are easier to monitor than more diﬀuse sys-
tems.
The analyses in this paper are subject to considerable qualiﬁcations and
interpretational limitations.
First, as our own results emphasize, concentration is not necessarily a
reliable indicator of competition (Tirole 1988; Sutton 1991, 1998). Merg-
ers and acquisitions that increase concentration could reﬂect competition,
not the absence of competition. A country with a few banks in a contest-
able market may be more competitive than a country with lots of banks in
segmented monopolies. This does not invalidate this paper’s usefulness.
Around the world, policymakers, in forming bank regulations, and courts,
in assessing antitrust challenges to bank consolidation, use banking sys-
tem concentration as a signal. Toward this end, our work suggests that (1)
banking system concentration is not associated with greater bank instabil-
ity; rather, it is associated with less fragility and (2) policies and regulations
that ease competition lower banking system fragility.
Second, although we use diﬀerent measures of banking system crises,
any examination of systemic crises is constrained by the diﬃculty in deﬁn-
ing and dating a “systemic” crisis. Thus, we interpret these results cau-
tiously and trust that this information is one useful input into assessing the
linkages between the market structure of the banking industry, bank regu-
lations, and banking system fragility. Future research that examines the in-
teractions between concentration, bank regulations, and bank fragility at
the microeconomic level will provide a very valuable addition to the crises
analyses that we provide.
Third, the absence of time series data on bank regulations lowers conﬁ-
dence in the ﬁnding that regulatory impediments to bank competition in-
crease fragility. The regulatory indicators are measured toward the end of
the sample period, so that these indicators are sometimes measured after
the crisis. This data limitation is diﬃcult to correct because it is only very
recently that detailed data have been collected on bank regulations around
the world (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2006). More im-
portantly for the purposes of this paper, this timing issue does not aﬀect the
core ﬁnding supporting the concentration-stability view, as these results
hold when including or excluding the regulatory indicators. Furthermore,
sensitivity checks suggest that regulatory impediments to competition did
not grow after systemic crises, so that reverse causality does not seem to
drive the results.
Finally, our exploratory evidence that (1) supports the view that con-
centrated banking systems tend to have larger, better-diversiﬁed banks and
(2) contradicts the view that concentrated banking systems with a few large
banks are easier to monitor is just that, exploratory. The measures that we
use are highly imperfect measures of diversiﬁcation and the ease of moni-
toring. Nevertheless, when including imperfect indicators of diversiﬁca-
198 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross Levinetion, this reduces the signiﬁcance of concentration in the fragility regres-
sions, suggesting that concentration may proxy for banking systems with
larger, better-diversiﬁed banks. Given the natural skepticism about our
proxies, however, considerably more evidence is required before one can
draw conﬁdent conclusions about the mechanisms underlying the negative
relationship between concentration and fragility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 analyzes
the relationship between banking system concentration and systemic
crises. Section 5.3 provides additional information on the mechanisms ex-
plaining the positive relationship between concentration and banking sys-
tem stability. Section 5.4 brieﬂy lists conclusions.
5.2 Does Bank Concentration Enhance the Risk of Systemic Failure?
In this section, we examine the impact of national bank concentration on
the likelihood of a country suﬀering a systemic banking crisis. Using data
on sixty-nine countries over the period 1980–1997, we assess the connec-
tion between banking system concentration and the incidence of systemic
banking failures.5 To assess the robustness of our analyses, we (1) use a
range of diﬀerent measures of bank concentration and crises, (2) control for
an array of country characteristics, (3) use diﬀerent estimation procedures 
and samples of countries, and (4) allow for potential nonlinearities in the
relationship between concentration and crises. After describing data and
methodology in the ﬁrst two subsections, we present the regression results.
5.2.1 Data
Data: Crises and Concentration
Following Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996), Caprio and Klingebiel
(1999), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), we identify and date
episodes of banking sector distress by using information on individual
bank failures and reports by national supervisory agencies. Then, these epi-
sodes of distress are classiﬁed as systemic if (1) emergency measures were
taken to assist the banking system (such as bank holidays, deposit freezes,
blanket guarantees to depositors or other bank creditors), or (2) large-
scale nationalizations took place, or (3) nonperforming assets reached at
least 10 percent of total assets at the peak of the crisis, or (4) the cost of the
rescue operations was at least 2 percent of GDP. In sum, our sample of
sixty-nine countries contains forty-seven crisis episodes. Table 5.1 lists this
information.
Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is going through
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5. Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) investigate the impact of bank concentra-
tion on bank net interest margins, but they do not examine bank fragility.Table 5.1 Bank concentration and competition and banking crises





Benin 362 (1988–1990) 1.00
Botswana 2,781 0.94
Burundi 186 1.00
Cameroon 790 (1987–1993, 1995–1998) 0.95
Canada 18,252 0.58
Chile 3,048 (1981–1987) 0.49
Colombia 1,802 (1982–1985) 0.49
Congo 940 1.00
Côte d’Ivoire 843 (1988–1991) 0.96
Cyprus 9,267 0.88
Denmark 31,049 0.78
Dominican Republic 1,426 0.65
Ecuador 1,516 (1995–1997) 0.40
Egypt 905 0.67
El Salvador 1,450 (1989) 0.84
Finland 23,204 (1991–1994) 0.85
France 24,227 0.44
Germany 27,883 0.48
Ghana 356 (1982–1989) 0.89
Greece 10,202 0.79
Guatemala 1,415 0.37
Guyana 653 (1993–1995) 1.00
Honduras 694 0.44
India 313 (1991–1997) 0.47
Indonesia 761 (1992–1997) 0.44
Ireland 13,419 0.74
Israel 13,355 (1983–1984) 0.84
Italy 17,041 (1990–1995) 0.35
Jamaica 1,539 (1996–1997) 0.82
Japan 35,608 (1992–1997) 0.24
Jordan 1,646 (1989–1990) 0.92
Kenya 336 (1993) 0.74
Korea 6,857 (1997) 0.31
Lesotho 356 1.00
Malaysia 3,197 (1985–1988, 1997) 0.54
Mali 260 (1987–1989) 0.91
Mauritius 2,724 0.94
Mexico 3,240 (1982, 1994–1997) 0.63
Nepal 179 (1988–1997) 0.90
The Netherlands 22,976 0.76
New Zealand 15,539 0.77
Nigeria 251 (1991–1995) 0.83
Norway 28,843 (1987–1993) 0.85
Panama 2,824 (1988–1989) 0.42
Papua New Guinea 1,024 (1989–1997) 0.87a systemic crisis, and 0 if it is not. We experiment with diﬀerent ways of dat-
ing and deﬁning crises.6 First, since crises run for multiple years and since
crises may inﬂuence concentration and other explanatory variables, im-
plying reverse causality, most of the regressions reported in the tables ex-
clude observations classiﬁed as crises after the initial year of the crisis. That
is, we only include the initial year of a multiyear crisis. We do include the
years after a multiyear crisis is over, which are noncrisis observations.7 If
the country suﬀers a second crisis, this is included as well. Second, we also
conducted the analyses when including crisis observations following the
initial year of a multiyear banking crisis. The results are robust to includ-
ing these years and classifying them as either crisis observations or noncri-
sis observations. Thus, the results are not sensitive to the classiﬁcation of
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6. Clearly, there may be disagreements about the dating of major crises. For example, the
database we are using classiﬁes the United States as having a crisis from 1980–1992, and many
may dispute this dating. Nevertheless, we use diﬀerent dating conventions and we use diﬀer-
ent subsamples to reduce fears that dating problems drive the results.
7. The results also hold when dropping all postcrisis years for each country experiencing a
crisis.
Peru 2,458 (1983–1990) 0.69
Philippines 1,070 (1981–1987) 0.49
Portugal 8,904 (1986–1989) 0.46
Senegal 562 (1988–1991) 0.94
Sierra Leone 260 (1990–1997) 1.00
Singapore 20,079 0.71
South Africa 3,680 (1985) 0.77
Sri Lanka 588 (1989–1993) 0.86
Swaziland 1,254 (1995) 0.95
Sweden 24,845 (1990–1993) 0.89
Switzerland 42,658 0.77
Thailand 1,886 (1983–1987, 1997) 0.54
Togo 366 1.00
Tunisia 1,831 0.63
Turkey 2,451 (1982, 1991, 1994) 0.45
United Kingdom 16,883 0.57
United States 24,459 (1980–1992) 0.19
Uruguay 5,037 (1981–1985) 0.87
Venezuela 3,558 (1993–1997) 0.52
Zambia 464 0.84
Source: See table 5A.1 for sources.
Notes:  GDP per capita is in constant dollars, averaged over the entire sample period,
1980–1997. Crisis period denotes the years in which each country experienced a systemic
banking crisis and the duration of said crisis. Concentration is a measure of concentration in
the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in
each country, averaged over 1988–1997.
Table 5.1 (continued)
Country GDP per capita Crisis period Concentrationthe crisis years following the initial year of multiyear crisis. Again, once
each crisis is over, we include the noncrisis years that follow a multiyear cri-
sis in all of the speciﬁcations. Third, this paper’s ﬁndings are robust to
changing the deﬁnition of a crisis to also include borderline crises as de-
ﬁned by Caprio and Klingebiel (1999). Speciﬁcally, borderline cases do not
meet the deﬁnition of a systemic crisis described previously and instead in-
clude cases where a large bank fails. We do not believe it is appropriate to
include borderline cases because we are assessing the impact of banking
system concentration on systemic banking crises, not the failure of a large
bank. In sum, while recognizing that there is no single, unanimous deﬁni-
tion of a systemic banking crisis, the primary goal of this section is to pro-
vide a cross-country, time series assessment of the relationship between na-
tional bank concentration and crises. The identiﬁed relationship is robust
to using these diﬀerent deﬁnitions of a systemic crisis.
Concentrationequals the share of total banking system assets held by the
three largest banks. The data are from the Bankscope database. Since the
sample of banks covered in Bankscope increased over the sample period,
changes in the concentration measure could reﬂect changes in coverage. To
reduce biases stemming from the coverage problem, we average the con-
centration measure over the period 1988–1997. As reported in tables 5.1
and 5.2, most countries have concentrated banking systems with a sample
mean of 72 percent. Still, there is wide cross-country variation in the
sample, with concentration levels ranging from less than 20 percent for the
United States to 100 percent for many African countries. Simple correla-
tions show a signiﬁcant negative relationship between the crisis dummy
and bank concentration.
In robustness tests, we consider a number of diﬀerent concentration
measures. This paper’s results hold when using (1) annual concentration
values, (2) concentration from Bankscope measured at the beginning of
the sample period (1988), and (3) a measure of concentration based on the
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) survey of bank supervisory agencies re-
garding deposits in banks.8 Moreover, by conﬁrming our results using the
initial level of concentration at the start of the sample period, we reduce re-
verse causality concerns. Unfortunately, using initial values cuts the num-
ber of observations in half. Thus, we focus on the data averaged over the
entire period.
Data: Core Control Variables
To investigate the relationship between systemic banking crises and
banking system concentration, we condition on an assortment of macro-
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8. This alternative measure of concentration is from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004)
survey database, which deﬁnes bank concentration as the share of deposits of the largest ﬁve
banks. The correlation between the concentration measures calculated from Bankscope data
and from Barth, Caprio, and Levine is 52 percent, and is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.economic and regulatory factors that may also inﬂuence banking system
fragility.
We start with the explanatory variables from DD’s (2002) examination
of the determinants of banking system crises. DD (2002) include four con-
temporary explanatory variables to control for macroeconomic factors
that may aﬀect the quality of bank assets and bank proﬁtability: (1) na-
tional economic growth (real GDP growth), (2) changes in the external
terms of trade (terms of trade change), (3) the rate of inﬂation (inﬂation),
and (4) the short-term real interest rate (real interest rate). DD (2002) in-
clude two variables to control for international forces inﬂuencing bank vul-
nerability: (1) the rate of exchange rate depreciation (depreciation) and 
(2) the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves (M2/reserves). Since rapid
credit growth may signal an asset price bubble, DD (2002) include lagged
credit growth (credit growtht–2). To condition on the overall level of eco-
nomic development, DD (2002) also include the level of real per capita
GDP (GDP per capita). In robustness tests, we also include DD’s (2002)
measure of deposit insurance generosity (moral hazard). To build an ag-
gregate index of moral hazard, DD (2002) estimate the ﬁrst principal com-
ponent of various deposit insurance design features. Speciﬁcally, they use
coinsurance, coverage of foreign currency and interbank deposits, type of
funding, source of funding, management, membership, and the level of ex-
plicit coverage to create this aggregate index, which increases with the gen-
erosity of the deposit insurance regime. The index varies over time, since
diﬀerent countries adopted deposit insurance or revised its design features
at diﬀerent points in time.
Simple correlations in table 5.2 suggest that banking crises are more
likely in countries with less concentrated banking systems, higher levels of
inﬂation and exchange rate depreciation, and less likely in growing coun-
tries with higher GDP per capita and higher real interest rates. Crises are
more likely in countries with more generous deposit insurance.
Data: Bank Regulation and Supervision Control Variables
We augment the benchmark speciﬁcation from DD (2002) by including
measures of bank regulation and supervision from Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2001a, 2001b, 2004). These data on bank supervision and regula-
tion around the world were collected through surveys of government oﬃ-
cials from over 100 countries in 1999. This is a problem, because the crises
regressions are run over the period 1980–1997. Thus, the regulatory indi-
cators are measured after the dependent variable. Besides the fact that no
other dataset has the level of cross-country detail on bank regulations, we
oﬀer three additional defenses for using these data in the crisis regressions
(despite the timing problem). First, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b) show
that the regulatory restrictions on bank activities did not change much fol-
lowing systemic crises. Moreover, in the few cases when they did change,











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.there was a change toward fewer regulatory restrictions. Thus, the timing
of the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b) data actually biases the results
against ﬁnding a positive relationship between regulatory restrictions on
bank activities and the likelihood of suﬀering a systemic crisis. Second,
Carkovic and Levine (2002) show that the bank regulations that compose
the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b) survey have remained virtually un-
changed in Chile during the decade of the 1990s. Third, Barth, Caprio, and
Levine’s (2006) follow-up survey indicates that there have been remarkably
few substantive changes in bank regulatory regimes since the initial survey
in 1999, which advertises the stability of bank supervisory and regulatory
policies. Nevertheless, timing issues are an important constraint on our
ability to draw conﬁdent conclusions on the market power, diversiﬁcation,
and easier monitoring explanations of why concentration is associated
with more stable banking systems.
We include bank regulation indicators to accomplish three objectives.
First, controlling for diﬀerences in national policies provides a simple ro-
bustness test of the relationship between concentration and crises. Second,
controlling for regulations provides additional information on the concen-
tration-fragility relationship. If concentration is proxying for regulations
that impede competition, then controlling for the regulatory environment
will drive out the signiﬁcance of concentration in the crisis regression. Fi-
nally, examining the relationship between bank regulations and banking
system stability is independently valuable, since countries may implement
regulations to promote banking system stability. The timing problem pri-
marily, though not necessarily exclusively, aﬀects this last motivation for
including the regulatory controls: the fact that regulations are measured
after crises reduces the conﬁdence we have in the results on regulations.
Fraction of entry denied equals the number of entry applications denied
as a fraction of the number of applications received from domestic and for-
eign entities, which is a measure of entry restrictions in banking and thus
the contestability of the market. If entry restrictions only increase bank
proﬁts, this would be associated with a lower rate of fragility. If, however,
entry restrictions induce ineﬃciencies in the banking market, then they
could lead to greater fragility.
Activity restrictions is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activ-
ities. This includes information on regulations regarding bank activities in
the securities, insurance, real estate markets, and banks owning nonﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms. For each of these four categories of bank activities each country
is given a score of 1 through 4, depending on the degree to which regula-
tions restrict bank activity in each area: (1) unrestricted, (2) permitted, (3)
restricted, or (4) prohibited. The aggregate indicator has therefore a range
from 4 to 16, with higher numbers indicating more restrictions on bank ac-
tivities. If these activity restrictions keep banks from entering risky lines of
206 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross Levinebusiness, then Activity Restrictions will tend to reduce the probability of
crises. If, however, regulatory restrictions on bank activities prevent ﬁrms
from diversifying risks, then higher values of Activity Restrictions will tend
to increase the probability of suﬀering a systemic crisis.
Required reservesequals the ratio of bank deposits that regulators require
banks to hold as reserves. Banking systems with higher ratios of required
reserves may be more stable, since they would have a greater buﬀer to ab-
sorb liquidity shocks. However, greater required reserves are also a tax on
the banking system, which may lower proﬁts and raise fragility.
Capital regulatory index is a summary measure of each country’s capital
stringency requirements, taken from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004). To
the extent that book capital is an accurate measure of bank solvency we ex-
pect better-capitalized banks to be less fragile. Also, capital regulations are
a focus of Basel agreements to reduce systemic risk. Thus, including an
index of national capital regulations will provide information on whether
cross-country diﬀerences in one of the three pillars of the Basel II Accord
on prudential bank supervision and regulation actually explain diﬀerences
in banking system fragility. Problematically, however, Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2006) stress that Basel’s success and the lack of historical data on
capital regulations makes it diﬃcult to assess the impact of capital regula-
tions. Speciﬁcally, because Basel has successfully harmonized capital reg-
ulations over the past decade, there may be insuﬃcient cross-country vari-
ation in the Capital Regulatory Index to explain systemic crises.
Oﬃcial supervisory power is an index of the power of the commercial
bank supervisory agency to monitor and discipline banks (Barth, Caprio,
and Levine 2004). It includes information on the legal power of the super-
visory authority to (1) meet with, demand information from, and impose
penalties on auditors, (2) force a bank to change its internal organizational
structure, managers, directors, and so on, (3) oblige the bank to provision
against potential bad loans, suspend dividends, bonuses, management
fees, and to supersede the rights of shareholders, and (4) intervene a bank
and/or declare a bank insolvent. The appendix provides a more detailed
deﬁnition of Oﬃcial Supervisory Power. An emphasis of the Basel II ac-
cord on prudential supervision and regulation is to strengthen oﬃcial
monitoring of banks. We use this indicator of the power of the supervisory
authority to assess the robustness of the results on concentration and to ex-
amine the relationship between Oﬃcial Supervisory Power and the proba-
bility that a country suﬀers a systemic crisis.
Data: Bank Ownership Control Variables
Next, we also control for ownership.
State ownership equals the percentage of banking system assets con-
trolled by banks that are 50 percent or more government owned, which is
Bank Concentration and Fragility 207taken from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a, 2001b) database.9 If
government-owned banks enjoy greater government support than private
banks, then banking systems with a larger share of public banks may ex-
perience fewer banks runs and fewer (overt) banking crises. However, in-
eﬃciencies in public banks may also make them more fragile, as argued by
Caprio and Martinez-Peria (2000). While providing evidence on the rela-
tionship between ownership and crises, we use State Ownership as a con-
trol variable to test the robustness of the results between concentration and
crises. There is not a signiﬁcant correlation between State Ownership and
crises.
Foreign ownership equals the percentage of the banking system’s assets
in banks that are 50 percent or more foreign owned, which is also taken
from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a, 2001b) database. Foreign banks
may bring better banking practices that improve the operation and safety
of the banking system (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga 2001).
On the other hand, greater openness to foreign banks could intensify com-
petition, reduce proﬁts, and hurt stability. Thus, it is an empirical question
as to whether, on net, foreign bank ownership stabilizes or destabilizes a
banking system. Again, our goal is to assess the robustness of the relation-
ship between concentration and crises, not to fully explore the impact of
foreign banks on the operation of a domestic ﬁnancial system. The simple
correlation between Foreign Ownership and crises is insigniﬁcant.
Data: Openness, Competition, Institutional Control Variables
Finally, we include additional control variables for the general openness,
competitiveness, and institutional development of the banking sector in
particular and the economy more generally. There is overlap between some
of these general indexes and the individual regulatory and ownership vari-
ables deﬁned earlier. Also, there is overlap between these general indica-
tors. Thus, we note these overlaps in deﬁning the variables and do not in-
clude them simultaneously in the regressions that follow.
Banking freedom is an indicator of the relative openness of the banking
system. We obtain these data from the Heritage Foundation and use an av-
erage over the period 1995–1997. It is a composite index of the barriers for-
eign banks and ﬁnancial services ﬁrms face in conducting banking opera-
tions, how diﬃcult it is to open domestic banks and other ﬁnancial services
ﬁrms, how heavily regulated the ﬁnancial system is, the presence of state-
owned banks, whether the government inﬂuences allocation of credit, and
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9. As a robustness check, we employ a diﬀerent measure of state ownership than La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), which equals the percentage of government owner-
ship (voting rights) of the assets of the ten largest banks in each country where ownership of
each bank is weighted by the assets of that bank. Thus, the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2002) measure does not deﬁne bank ownership in terms of voting rights greater than
50 percent. We get the same results with both measures.whether banks are restricted from providing insurance and securities mar-
ket services to clients. Higher values indicate fewer restrictions on banking
freedoms. This aggregate Banking Freedom indicator also uses informa-
tion from the regulatory restrictions, entry restrictions, and ownership in-
dicators discussed previously. We include this for two reasons. First, debate
exists on the impact of oﬃcial restrictions on bank operations. On the one
hand, fewer oﬃcial impediments to bank operations and entry could stim-
ulate eﬃciency and diversiﬁcation, which promotes stability. On the other
hand, greater banking freedom could induce destabilizing competition. We
provide information on this debate. Second, oﬃcial impediments to bank-
ing freedom could inﬂuence both concentration and fragility. Since our
goal is to assess the independent link between concentration and crises, we
test the robustness of the ﬁndings to controlling for banking freedom.
Economic freedom is an indicator of how a country’s policies rank in
terms of providing economic freedoms. It is a composite of ten indicators
ranking policies in the areas of trade, government ﬁnances, government in-
terventions, monetary policy, capital ﬂows and foreign investment, bank-
ing and ﬁnance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and black
market activity. We obtain these data from the Heritage Foundation and
use an average over the period 1995–1997. Higher scores indicate policies
more conducive to competition and economic freedom. Also, Banking
Freedom is a subcomponent of Economic Freedom, which includes infor-
mation on economic freedom beyond the banking industry. To the extent
that freedoms allow banks to improve eﬃciency and to engage in diﬀerent
activities and diversify their risks, we expect an increased level of freedoms
to reduce fragility. However, it is also true that greater freedoms allow
banks to undertake greater risks, particularly if the underlying institu-
tional environment and existing regulations and supervision distort risk-
taking incentives. Thus, overall greater freedom may also lead to greater
bank fragility. Thus, we (1) examine the relationship between economic
freedom and crises and (2) assess the strength of the relationship between
concentration and crises conditional on overall economic freedom.
KKZ composite is an index of the overall level of institutional develop-
ment constructed by Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). The
underlying indicators are voice and accountability, government eﬀective-
ness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of cor-
ruption. This index is available for 1998. We expect better institutions to
lead to reduced bank fragility, controlling for all other factors. Simple cor-
relations indicate that the crisis dummy is negatively and signiﬁcantly
correlated with the two freedom indicators and the institutions variable.
Countries with better institutions also tend to have more competitive
banking systems with fewer regulatory restrictions. Thus, it is indepen-
dently valuable to examine the relationship between institutional develop-
ment and banking system stability. At the same time, we use KKZ Com-
Bank Concentration and Fragility 209posite to gauge the strength of the independent relationship between con-
centration and crises.
5.2.2 Methodology
Methodologically, to estimate the crisis model we follow Cole and
Gunther (1995), Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu, and Billings (1997),
Demirgüç-Kunt (1989), and DD (1998, 2002) and use a logit probability
model with standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. Speciﬁ-
cally, we estimate the probability that a systemic crisis will occur at a par-
ticular time in a particular country, assuming that this probability is a func-
tion of explanatory variables (X[i, t]). Let P(i, t) denote a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 when a banking crisis occurs in country i and time
t and a value of zero otherwise.   is a vector of n unknown coeﬃcients and
F(  X [i, t]) is the cumulative probability distribution function evaluated at
  X(i, t). Then, the log-likelihood function of the model is
Ln L   ∑
t 1...T ∑
i 1...n
(P(i, t)ln{F[  X(i, t)]}   (1   P[i, t])ln{1   F[  X(i, t)]}.
We also conducted robustness tests using alternative estimation proce-
dures. First, this core speciﬁcation allows for heteroskedasticity but as-
sumes that the errors are independent. We conﬁrm the results, however,
when allowing for clustering of the errors within countries, which requires
that the error terms are independent across countries but not within coun-
tries. Second, the results hold when estimating a logit model with random
country eﬀects.
5.2.3 Results
The paper ﬁnds that crises are less likely in more concentrated banking
systems using diﬀerent measures of concentration and conditioning on
diﬀerent country characteristics. As shown in table 5.3, concentration al-
ways enters with a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Regression 1 pre-
sents our baseline speciﬁcation, where we exclude observations classiﬁed
as crises after the ﬁrst year of a multiyear banking crisis. Regressions 2 and
3 include crisis observations after the initial crisis year. In column 2, crisis
observations following the initial year of a multiyear crisis are classiﬁed as
crises.10In column 3, crisis observations after the initial year of a multiyear
crisis are classiﬁed as noncrisis observations.11In all three regressions, con-
centration enters negatively and signiﬁcantly.
The negative relationship between concentration and crises is robust to
210 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross Levine
10. This explains the entry of 202 crises in column 2 of table 5.3. When we include all of the
years of each multiyear banking crisis, this adds an additional 155 crisis observations to the
number reported in regressions 1 and 3.
11. In all three speciﬁcations, we include observations after the crisis is over. Thus, we in-
clude the switch from crisis to the noncrisis state.Table 5.3 Banking crisis and concentration
Speciﬁcation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real GDP growth –0.163*** –0.088*** –0.136*** –0.306*** –0.164*** –0.164***
(0.035) (0.020) (0.030) (0.074) (0.035) (0.033)
Terms of trade change –0.013 –0.008 –0.011 –0.034 –0.015 –0.012
(0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.024) (0.013) (0.012)
Real interest rate 0.010*** 0.006** 0.002 0.009 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Inﬂation 0.009 0.006** –0.002 –0.016 0.009 0.008
(0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.024) (0.008) (0.009)
M2/reserves 0.002* 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Depreciation 0.453 0.624 0.706 1.802 0.777 0.491
(1.142) (0.425) (0.991) (2.696) (1.133) (1.151)
Credit growtht–2 0.014* –0.001 0.012 0.028*** 0.015* 0.014
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Real GDP per capita –0.004* –0.000*** –0.000* –0.006* –0.002
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002)
Concentration –1.946*** –1.479*** –1.696** –3.744*** –1.607** –1.845***
(0.797) (0.415) (0.747) (1.430) (0.805) (0.797)
G10 countries 1.011
(2.332)
G10 countries   –3.287
concentration (5.091)
No. of crises 47 202 47 20 47 47
No. of observations 989 1,144 1,144 410 989 989
Percent crises correct 68 57 64 70 68 70
Percent correct 73 66 67 76 72 72
Model  2 47.83*** 75*** 37.37*** 40.34*** 38.19*** 46.38***
Sources: See table 5A.1 for sources.
Notes:The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis[Country=j, Time=t] =   +  1 Real GDP growthj,t +  2 Terms of
trade changej,t +  3 Real interest ratej,t +  4 Inﬂationj,t +  5M2/reservesj,t +  6Depreciationj,t +  7 Credit growthj,t–2 +  8
Real GDP per capitaj,t +  9 Average concentrationj,t +  10 G10 countriesj,t + εj,t. The dependent variable is a crisis
dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic crisis and the value of zero otherwise. Growth is the rate of
growth of real GDP. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inﬂation. Inﬂa-
tion is the rate of change of the GDP deﬂator. M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves. Credit growth is
the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods. Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate. G10
country is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for G10 countries and zero otherwise. Concentration is a measure
of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each
country, averaged over the sample period. Banking freedom measures the relative openness of the banking and ﬁnan-
cial system. The sample period is 1980–1997. Speciﬁcation (1) excludes all crisis observations after the initial year of
crisis. Speciﬁcation (2) includes the crisis periods (after the initial crisis year) as crisis observations. Speciﬁcation (3) in-
cludes the crisis periods (after the initial crisis year) as non-crisis observations. In speciﬁcation (4) Average Concen-
tration is replaced by the Initial Concentration, and is restricted to the actual starting date and years following that
date. Speciﬁcation (5) omits real GDP per capita. Speciﬁcation (6) includes G10 country dummy and its interaction
with concentration. White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. See table 5A.1 for
detailed variable deﬁnitions.
***Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
**Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
*Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.alternative speciﬁcations and to controlling for reverse causality. If sys-
temic crises reduce concentration, then it would be inappropriate to inter-
pret our early results as implying that concentration reduces banking
system fragility. Thus, in regression 4, we use the value of banking system
concentration measured at the beginning of the sample period instead of
concentration averaged over the period. Even when using initial concen-
tration, however, we continue to ﬁnd a negative relationship between con-
centration and crises. Regression 5 shows that the results do not depend on
including or excluding real GDP per capita. Regression 6 assesses whether
the results change if the country is a Group of Ten (G10) country. We see
that country membership in the G10 does not alter the results on concen-
tration. Further, the insigniﬁcant interaction between concentration and
membership in G10 indicates that the relationship between concentration
and systemic banking fragility does not vary between the G10 countries
and the remainder of the sample.
Among the control variables in table 5.3, annual real GDP growth en-
ters negatively and signiﬁcantly throughout. This suggests that macroeco-
nomic success reduces the likelihood of suﬀering a crisis. Or, to phrase this
diﬀerently, recessions increase banking system fragility. The estimates also
indicate that real interest rate enters positively, which conﬁrms earlier re-
search (DD 1999).
Furthermore, the economic impact of banking system concentration on
the likelihood of a country suﬀering a systemic crisis is large. We evaluate
the marginal impact of concentration on the probability of crisis at the
mean values for all variables using regression 1 from table 5.3. The esti-
mates indicate that a 1 standard deviation increase in concentration leads
to a decrease in crisis probability of 1 percent. Since crisis probabilities at
any point in time are quite low, with a mean value of 4 percent, this is a sub-
stantial reduction. We have recalculated the economic impact of a mar-
ginal increase in bank concentration when using a sample that includes the
year after the initial year of the crisis. Using this larger sample, we ﬁnd an
even larger economic impact of concentration on crises than in the core re-
gression presented in table 5.3.
This paper’s ﬁndings hold when allowing for a potential nonlinear rela-
tionship between concentration and crises. First, we added a simple quad-
ratic term and found no evidence of a nonlinear relationship. Next, we es-
timated piecewise regressions, where concentration was broken into (a)
quintiles and then (b) deciles. The results indicate that the stabilizing eﬀect
of concentration becomes signiﬁcant after the ﬁrst quintile (second decile),
where the quintile and decile analyses identify consistent cutoﬀs. The data
indicate that there is a statistically signiﬁcant, negative relationship be-
tween concentration and banking system fragility for levels of concentra-
tion above 35 percent, and the marginal impact of a change in concentra-
tion does not vary signiﬁcantly beyond this 35 percent cutoﬀ. This cutoﬀ
212 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross Levineis low, considering that the sample mean value of national banking system
concentration is 72 percent. There is never a positive relationship between
concentration and fragility. Third, we examine whether concentration has
diﬀerent eﬀects in diﬀerent institutional settings by interacting concentra-
tion and our measures of institutional development (Economic Freedom
and KKZ composite). Again, this did not change the result of a negative
relationship between bank concentration and the probability of suﬀering a
systemic crisis.
The negative relationship between crises and concentration also holds
when using diﬀerent samples of countries. Speciﬁcally, we excluded all
countries with populations less than 1 million, less than 10 million, and less
than 20 million, respectively. The coeﬃcient on concentration remains
negative and signiﬁcant across these three diﬀerent samples of countries.
Next, we excluded all sub-Saharan African countries, since they tend to
have very high bank concentration ratios, and we eliminated the G10
countries because their high level of institutional development may not be
captured appropriately with the control variables. Again, these two diﬀer-
ent samples yield the same results. Finally, we excluded a few country-year
data points where the data seem to be mismeasured, because the values 
are extraordinarily diﬀerent from the country’s average value over the
sample.12 The results do not change.
In sum, these results are consistent with the concentration-stability the-
ory’s argument that banking systems characterized by a few large banks
are more stable than less concentrated banking markets. There is certainly
no evidence that banking system concentration increases banking sector
fragility. Furthermore, the inverse relationship between banking system
concentration and the likelihood of suﬀering a systemic crisis holds when
allowing for possible nonlinear links between concentration and fragility
and when using diﬀerent samples of countries. Next, we assess the robust-
ness of these results to conditioning on additional country-speciﬁc traits.
5.2.4 Additional Sensitivity Tests and Discussion
Additional Country Level Controls
In table 5.4, we conﬁrm the ﬁndings on the relationship between bank-
ing sector concentration and systemic crises when controlling for (1) moral
hazard associated with deposit insurance, (2) diﬀerent bank regulations,
(3) the ownership of banks, and (4) general indicators of banking freedom,
economic freedom, and institutional development. The results hold when
controlling for moral hazard, fraction of entry applications denied, activity
Bank Concentration and Fragility 213
12. Speciﬁcally, we eliminate Côte d’Ivoire (1993) because their M2/reserves values are very
diﬀerent for that year. Similarly, in these outlier tests, we exclude Peru (1991) because its in-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.restrictions, oﬃcial supervisory power, required reserves, and the capital
regulatory index (regressions 1–6). The signiﬁcance level on concentration
falls to a 10 percent level when including fraction of entry applications de-
nied, but data limitations on fraction of entry applications denied cuts the
sample from 989 to 583 observations. Furthermore, concentration remains
negatively associated with crises at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level when
controlling for state or foreign ownership of banks (regressions 7 and 8). In
terms of broad measures such as banking freedom or general indicators of
economic freedom and institutional development (KKZ composite), con-
centration continues to enter the crisis regressions negatively and signiﬁ-
cantly at the 1 percent level (regression 9–11). The regressions in table 5.4
do not include GDP per capita because (1) the regulatory/institutional
variables are highly correlated with the level of development and (2) GDP
per capita is often used to proxy for institutional development. However,
including GDP per capita in table 5.4 does not change the conclusions on
concentration.
Beyond concentration, the table 5.4 results indicate that tighter entry re-
strictions and more severe regulatory restrictions on bank activities boost
bank fragility. These are consistent with the results obtained by Barth,
Caprio, and Levine (2004), who examine the impact of entry restrictions
and regulatory restrictions on bank activities on crises in a purely cross-
country investigation that does not control for bank concentration. A
higher fraction of entry applications denied—a proxy for tighter entry reg-
ulations—leads to higher levels of fragility in the banking system. This is
consistent with the argument that restricted entry reduces the eﬃciency of
the banking system, also making it more vulnerable to external shocks.
Similarly, we ﬁnd that restrictions on bank activities increase crisis proba-
bilities. This result indicates that overall these restrictions prevent banks
from diversifying outside their traditional business, reducing their ability
to reduce the riskiness of their portfolios.
Overall, the results do not provide support for Basel II’s emphasis on cap-
ital regulations and more stringent regulations. We do not ﬁnd that stricter
capital regulations or greater oﬃcial supervisory power lowers the proba-
bility that a country will suﬀer a systemic crisis. While it is natural and ap-
propriate to question these results because of the timing issues emphasized
earlier, we are unaware of cross-country research that ﬁnds that banking
system stability is enhanced by countries adopting oﬃcial supervisory and
regulatory regimes that impose stricter capital regulations or more stringent
prudential regulations. Indeed, a growing body of evidence suggests that
strengthening oﬃcial supervisory power can actually increase corruption in
lending and reduce banking system eﬃciency (Barth, Caprio, and Levine
2006; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven,
and Levine 2004). Finally, conﬁrming earlier research, we also see that state
ownership is associated with greater fragility, albeit signiﬁcant only at 10
percent (Caprio and Martinez-Peria 2000).
216 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross LevineFurthermore, the results in table 5.4 suggest that openness, competition,
and institutional development foster greater banking system stability.
Countries with greater freedoms in banking (banking freedom) and gener-
ally more competitive economic systems (economic freedom) are less likely
to experience banking crises (regressions 9 and 10). This ﬁnding suggests
that concentration is not simply proxying for the degree of competition in
the banking industry. Better institutional environment is also associated
with a lower probability of systemic crisis (regression 11). The evidence is
consistent with theories that emphasize the stabilizing eﬀects of openness
and competition, but inconsistent with the many models that stress the
destabilizing eﬀects from competition.13
Costs of Banking Crises
We also assessed whether countries with concentrated banking systems
have bigger, more costly banking crises. If (1) concentrated banking sys-
tems are more likely to have too-big-to-fail policies and (2) too-big-to-fail
policies induce greater risk-taking and (3) too-big-too fail policies can op-
erate for only some ﬁxed period of time, then this suggests that crises will
be larger, though less frequent, in concentrated banking systems. If this
were the case, then our ﬁndings that concentration is associated with a
lower probability of suﬀering a systemic crisis may provide a misleading
impression of the concentration-stability relationship.
Thus, in table 5.5, we examine the relationship between banking system
concentration and the costs of banking crises. To include countries that
suﬀered no crises in the sample, we use a Tobit model, where zero implies
that the country did not experience a banking crisis. We use three diﬀerent
measures of banking crisis costs.
As shown in table 5.5, we ﬁnd no evidence for the contention that more
concentrated banking systems have more costly crises. Concentration does
not enter signiﬁcantly at the 5 percent level in any of the regressions. It en-
ters with a negative coeﬃcient across the diﬀerent cost measures. Given the
lack of a robust relationship, however, we do not draw the conclusion that
concentration reduces both the likelihood and the size of crises.
5.3 Why Is Concentration Stabilizing? 
Additional Evidence from Crisis Data
Although the ﬁnding of a negative relationship between banking system
concentration and the likelihood of suﬀering a systemic crisis is consistent
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13. Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) stress that competition exerts a stabilizing impact on banks
because more competitive banks charge lower interest rates to ﬁrms and these lower rates re-
duce the likelihood of default. This prediction is consistent with our results. However, Boyd
and De Nicoló (2005) use bank concentration as an indicator of bank competition. Thus, they
stress that concentration will exert a destabilizing impact on banks, which is inconsistent with
our results.Table 5.5 Banking crisis and concentration: Cost of crises
Speciﬁcation
(1) (2) (3)
Real GDP growth 3.821*** 3.614*** 1.553**
(0.811) (0.857) (0.814)
Terms of trade change –0.929* –0.832 0.047
(0.489) (0.593) (0.444)
Real interest rate 0.235 0.591** –0.139
(0.191) (0.291) (0.257)
Inﬂation 1.050*** 1.198*** 0.316
(0.196) (0.272) (0.225)
M2/reserves 0.144*** 0.080** 0.126***
(0.029) (0.036) (0.029)
Depreciation –57.818*** –141.172*** –26.592
(16.742) (32.809) (21.046)
Credit growtht–2 0.217 0.185 0.087
(0.141) (0.155) (0.178)
Real GDP per capita 0.000** 0.000 –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Moral hazard index 0.408 0.764 1.343*
(0.887) (0.912) (0.820)
Concentration –8.261 –15.006* –2.269
(7.499) (9.207) (9.355)
No. of observations 47 49 69
Notes: The Tobit model estimated takes the form: Cost of crisis[Country=j] =   +  1 Real GDP
growthj +  2 Terms of trade changej +  3 Real interest ratej +  4 Inﬂationj +  5M2/reservesj +
 6Depreciationj +  7 Credit growthj +  8 Moral hazard indexj +  9 Concentrationj + εj. The
dependent variables capture the ﬁscal cost of crisis. In speciﬁcation (1) we focus on one vari-
ation of the Klingebiel-Honohan ﬁscal cost measure, while in speciﬁcations (2) focus is on the
second variation of the Klingebiel-Honohan ﬁscal cost measure. Speciﬁcation (3) examines
the Boyd and Smith measure of cost of crisis. Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP. Real
interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inﬂation. Inﬂa-
tion is the rate of change of the GDP deﬂator. M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international
reserves. Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate. Credit growth is the real
growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods. Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral
hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is a measure of
concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three
largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period. White’s heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable deﬁnitions and sources
are given in the data appendix.
***Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
**Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
*Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.with the concentration-stability view (tables 5.3 and 5.4), the results do not
distinguish among possible explanations of this ﬁnding. Why is concentra-
tion stabilizing? This section explores the validity of diﬀerent explanations
for why bank concentration lowers banking system fragility.
5.3.1 Is It Market Power and Bank Proﬁts?
One possible argument is that the level of bank concentration proxies for
the degree of competition in the banking industry. According to this mar-
ket power view, powerful banks (either directly or through policymakers)
restrict competition, which boosts bank proﬁts, lowers incentives for risk
taking, and thus reduces systemic risk. Thus, the ﬁnding of a negative re-
lationship between banking system concentration and systemic crises is
consistent with the view that banking sector concentration increases bank-
ing system stability by reducing the openness and competitiveness of the
banking industry.
In contrast to this market power explanation of how concentration pro-
motes banking system stability, however, note that concentration remains
negatively associated with crises even when controlling for regulatory re-
strictions on bank activities and measures of the openness and competi-
tiveness of the banking industry and the economy more generally. Thus, to
the extent that these variables adequately control for competition, the ﬁnd-
ings suggest that something else besides market power is driving the nega-
tive relationship between bank concentration and bank fragility.
The ﬁndings on bank regulations, banking freedom, economic freedom,
and institutional development also run counter to the view that competi-
tion intensiﬁes fragility. Restrictions on competition and openness—such
as regulatory impediments to the entry of new banks, or regulatory barri-
ers to banks engaging in nonlending services, or general indicators of the
openness of the banking industry or the overall economy—do not reduce
the probability of suﬀering a systemic banking crisis (table 5.4). Thus, the
ﬁndings that (1) concentration lowers banking system fragility and (2) low
competition raises banking system fragility imply that concentration is not
proxying for the degree of competition in the banking industry.
However, the measures of bank regulation, bank freedom, economic
freedom, and institutional development may not suﬃciently control for
competition in banking. Thus, given the diﬃculty in adequately control-
ling for the competitive environment using regulatory indicators, some may
view the table 5.4 results as too weak to discard the market power expla-
nation of why concentration is stabilizing.
5.3.2 Is It Diversiﬁcation?
Next, consider the argument that banks in more concentrated banking
systems are more diversiﬁed than banking systems composed of many
small banks. If this argument is correct and if we include good measures of
Bank Concentration and Fragility 219bank diversiﬁcation in the systemic crises regressions, then this should
drive out the signiﬁcance of bank concentration.
To proxy for the diversiﬁcation channel, we use three measures. First, we
use mean bank size, which equals total bank assets divided by the number
of banks.14 The presumption is that larger banks tend to be more diversi-
ﬁed. While clearly problematic, bank-level data on each bank’s asset hold-
ings are impossible to obtain. So, we use mean bank size in trying to assess
why concentration is associated with lower levels of banking system fra-
gility. If mean bank size does not drive out the signiﬁcance of concentra-
tion, this weakens the argument that concentrated banking systems have
larger, better-diversiﬁed banks than less concentrated banking systems
with smaller banks. However, since bank size does not directly measure
diversiﬁcation, ﬁnding that mean bank size drives out concentration pro-
vides only suggestive support for the diversiﬁcation argument.
Second, we include an indicator of regulatory restrictions on banks’ abil-
ity to diversify risk abroad. Speciﬁcally, no foreign loans equals 1 if banks
are prohibited from making foreign loans, and 0 otherwise. In many coun-
tries, it may be impossible for banks to suﬃciently diversify their asset
holding domestically. Thus, restrictions on investing abroad may doom do-
mestic banks to holding excessively risky assets. Indeed, countries with both
small banks and regulatory restrictions on those banks’ lending abroad
may have especially unstable banks. Again, if we control for these mea-
sures of diversiﬁcation and they drive out the signiﬁcance of concentration
in the systemic crisis regressions, then this provides smoking gun evidence
that concentration is associated with banking system stability because
concentration is associated with more diversiﬁed banks.
A third potential indicator of bank diversiﬁcation is the size of the econ-
omy. The presumption, albeit questionable, is that larger economies are
more diversiﬁed and therefore oﬀer banks easier means to hold diversiﬁed
loan portfolios. Thus, we include the level of GDP in attempting to dissect
the negative relationship between concentration and crises.15
The results in table 5.6 provide suggestive support for the view that con-
centrated banking systems are composed of bigger, more diversiﬁed banks
that are hence less prone to systemic failure. As the results in table 5.6 show,
the signiﬁcance of the concentration coeﬃcient drops to 10 percent when
we control for bank size and completely disappears when we control for the
size of the economy (regressions 1 and 2). These ﬁndings are consistent
with the view that part of the reason that concentration enhances stability
is that concentrated systems are composed of bigger, better-diversiﬁed
banks. Regression 3 indicates that including no foreign loans does not al-
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14. Using the mean bank size of the largest three banks does not change our results.
15. Replacing GDP by M2 to control for the size of the ﬁnancial system does not change
our results.ter the ﬁndings on banking system concentration. In regression 4, the con-
centration eﬀect becomes completely insigniﬁcant when including the (1)
mean bank size, (2) no foreign loans, and (3) the interaction term between
bank size and no foreign loans. The result in column 4 indicates that coun-
tries with larger banks become signiﬁcantly more prone to systemic crises
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Table 5.6 Banking crisis and concentration: Diversiﬁcation versus ease of supervision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Concentration –1.511* –1.379 –2.381** –1.653 –2.234* –2.111** –3.576**
(0.854) (0.860) (1.095) (1.119) (1.162) (1.061) (1.651)
Mean bank size 0.004 0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
No foreign loans 0.153 –0.350
(0.635) (0.617)










No. of crises 47 47 34 34 34 34 29
No. of observations 988 989 767 767 767 767 527
Percent of crises correct 68 72 65 62 62 68 72
Percent correct 73 73 79 79 79 79 78
Model  2 48.36*** 48.79*** 49.43*** 43.90*** 43.90*** 43.43*** 48.31***
Source: See table 5A.1 for sources.
Notes: The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis[Country=j, Time=t] =   +  1 Real GDP growthj,t+  2 Terms of
trade changej,t +  3 Real interest ratej,t +  4 Inﬂationj,t +  5M2/reservesj,t +  6Depreciationj,t+  7 Credit growthj,t–2 +  8
Real GDP per capitaj,t +  9 Moral hazard indexj,t+  10Concentrationj,t+  11Mean Bank Sizej,t+  12No foreign loansj,t
+  13 GDPj,t+  14 No. of Banksj,t +  15 Activity Restrictionsj,t +  16 Cashﬂow rightsj,t + εj,t. The dependent variable is a
crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic crisis and the value of zero otherwise. Growth is the
rate of growth of real GDP. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inﬂation.
Inﬂation is the rate of change of the GDP deﬂator. M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves. Credit
growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods. Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.
Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration
is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks
in each country, averaged over the sample period. The sample period is 1980–1997. Mean bank size is given by average
bank asset size (in billions of U.S. dollars). No foreign loans takes the value one if banks are prohibited from investing
abroad and 0 otherwise. GDP is real GDP in billions of US$. Number of banks is given in hundreds and activity re-
strictions captures bank’s ability to engage in business of securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling,
and in real estate investment, management, and development. Both are from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a, 2001b)
database. Cashﬂow is the fraction of a bank’s total cash-ﬂow rights held by each bank’s main owner, averaged across
each country’s banks (Caprio, Laeven, and Levine 2003). White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are
given in parentheses. See table 5A.1 for detailed variable deﬁnitions.
***Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
**Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
*Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.if they prohibit their banks from investing abroad. This ﬁnding on the in-
teraction between bank size and regulatory restrictions on foreign loans
runs counter to our prediction that restrictions on foreign lending would
be particularly destabilizing for small (presumably less diversiﬁed) banks.
Nevertheless, while these measures of diversiﬁcation are highly imperfect,
including these proxies for diversiﬁcation drives out the signiﬁcance of
banking system concentration and suggests that the diversiﬁcation expla-
nation has some merit.
5.3.3 Is It Easier Monitoring?
A third argument for why concentration is stabilizing is that (1) concen-
trated banking systems tend to have a few large banks and (2) a few large
banks are easier to monitor than many small ones. As earlier, if this easier
monitoring argument is correct and if we include good measures of moni-
toring in the crisis regressions, then this should drive out the signiﬁcance
of bank concentration. Of course, there are countervailing views. Large
banks may be substantially more complex than small banks. So, supervi-
sion may be more diﬃcult with a few complex banks than with a higher
number of simple banks.16
We use three measures to attempt to capture empirically the ease of
monitoring banks. First, we use the number of banks, which equals the
number of banks in the economy. The easier monitoring argument relies on
the presumption that concentrated banking systems have a few large
banks, and this is crucial in explaining better monitoring and greater bank-
ing system stability. Second, activity restrictions equals regulatory restric-
tions on the ability of banks to engage in securities market, insurance, and
real estate activities as well as restrictions on banks owning nonﬁnancial
ﬁrms. The presumption is that greater regulatory restrictions will make it
easier to monitor banks. So, to the extent that regulatory restrictions are
correlated with bank concentration, this would help account for the nega-
tive relationship between concentration and systemic crises. Third, cash-
ﬂow is the fraction of a bank’s total cash-ﬂow rights held by each bank’s
main owner, averaged across each country’s banks. As suggested by La
Porta et al. (1999) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002),
countries where laws and regulations are ineﬀective at protecting the rights
of small shareholders will tend to have corporations that do not rely on
small shareholders to exert corporate control, and instead have concen-
trated cash-ﬂow rights to induce the main owner to exert sound corporate
governance. In terms of banks, Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2003) show
222 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross Levine
16. As pointed out to us by Mark Carey and René Stulz, there is another dimension to this
monitoring argument. If monitoring skills are scarce and there are economies of scope in
monitoring, then concentrated banking systems may facilitate monitoring. However, the
scarcity of monitoring skills, and hence the beneﬁts of concentration, may be diﬀerent across
countries.that a bank’s major owner tends to have higher cash-ﬂow rights in coun-
tries where the institutions underlying monitoring of banks are weak, such
as weak shareholder protection laws or ineﬀective bank supervision and
regulation. These weak institutions discourage diﬀuse ownership and pro-
duce concentrated ownership of banks. Thus, we use each country’s aver-
age cash-ﬂow rights across banks as an additional proxy of each country’s
monitoring regime. If including cash-ﬂow rights eliminates the signiﬁcance
of concentration, concerns would naturally arise about the endogeneity of
cash-ﬂow rights. But if including cash-ﬂow rights does not alter the results
on concentration, then this simply represents an additional, if ﬂawed, ro-
bustness check.
The results presented in table 5.6 do not provide support for the easier
monitoring view of why concentration reduces the likelihood of suﬀering
a systemic crisis. Including the number of banks reduces the signiﬁcance of
concentration to 10 percent, but the signiﬁcance level is restored once we
also control for activity restrictions. Including cash-ﬂows does not alter the
ﬁndings on concentration either. Number of banks and activity restric-
tions do not enter the crises regressions signiﬁcantly. Cash-ﬂow enters pos-
itively, which is consistent with the view that in countries with weak legal
and corporate governance institutions and ineﬀective bank supervision
and regulation the ownership structure adjusts such that cash-ﬂow be-
comes concentrated in order to boost monitoring incentives. However, the
resultant outcome is still associated with a higher likelihood of suﬀering a
crisis. For the purposes of this paper, the point is that including proxies for
the monitoring regime does not alter the results on concentration signiﬁ-
cantly. This suggests, to the extent that these are reasonable proxies, that
concentration is not a simple proxy for easier monitoring.
5.4 Conclusions
To summarize, using a cross-country, time series panel of data on sys-
temic banking crises, we ﬁnd that greater bank concentration is associated
with a lower likelihood of suﬀering a crisis. We never ﬁnd that concentra-
tion increases fragility. While subject to the qualiﬁcations stressed in the in-
troduction and throughout the paper, the negative relationship between
concentration and crises is robust to including various control variables,
including indicators of the macroeconomic environment, the international
environment, the domestic banking environment, bank supervisory and
regulatory policies, and indexes of overall economic freedom and institu-
tional development. Furthermore, reverse causality does not seem to be driv-
ing the concentration-stability ﬁndings. Thus, the data on systemic crises
are more consistent with the concentration-stability view than with the
concentration-fragility view.
In searching for the mechanisms underlying the concentration-stability
Bank Concentration and Fragility 223result, we ﬁnd no support for the view that banking system concentration
is a proxy for a less competitive banking environment. We draw this con-
clusion for two reasons. First, when we include regulatory and institutional
measures of the degree of competition in banking and the overall economy,
we ﬁnd that crises are less—not more—likely in competitive regulatory
and institutional environments. Second, even when we control for these
regulatory and institutional measures of the degree of competition, we
continue to ﬁnd that concentration is negatively associated with systemic
crises. To the extent that we have good measures of the competitive envi-
ronment, these ﬁndings suggest that banking system concentration is a
proxy for something else besides banking industry competition.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd suggestive support that concentrated banking sys-
tems have more diversiﬁed banks, but not evidence that concentrated
banking systems with a few large banks are easier to monitor and hence
more stable than less concentrated banking systems. On ease of monitor-
ing, none of our measures of the ease of monitoring enters signiﬁcantly,
and including them in the analyses did not alter the coeﬃcient on bank
concentration. On diversiﬁcation, the data indicate that part of the reason
concentrated banking systems lower the probability of suﬀering a systemic
crisis is that concentrated banking systems tend to have larger, better-
diversiﬁed banks with a correspondingly lower probability of failure. We
draw this tentative conclusion because the concentration-crisis link weak-
ens appreciably when we include proxies for diversiﬁcation. We emphasize,
however, that these proxies are aggregate indicators and do not directly
measure individual bank asset diversiﬁcation, and hence we view these re-
sults as suggestive and hope that they stimulate cross-country, bank-level
research into this important policy issue.
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Comment René M. Stulz
Kwast and De Nicolo (2001) and Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries
(chapter 4, this volume) ﬁnd that interdependencies among large banks
increased in the 1990s for, respectively, the United States, and the United
Bank Concentration and Fragility 231Kingdom and the eurozone. A plausible explanation for these ﬁndings is
that bank consolidation led to an increase in systemic risk. While some ob-
servers are concerned that increases in bank concentration have led to in-
creases in systemic risk, this belief is not universally shared. For instance,
the recent Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group report concludes
that systemic risk has decreased in the banking system in recent years.
The paper by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine makes an important
contribution to this debate. They look across countries to ﬁnd whether
there is a relation between bank concentration and the extent to which a
country spends its time in banking crises. They ﬁnd that bank concentra-
tions is associated with fewer crises across the globe. As is typical of the
papers by these authors, it is hard to think of a robustness check that they
have not already attempted. Consequently, it would be a waste of my time
to try to argue that maybe after all there is a positive relation between
banking concentration and banking crises. After reading the paper, one
has to conclude that, across the world, countries with higher bank concen-
tration have not been more likely to experience banking crises.
The strength of the paper is that it allows us to dismiss the simple argu-
ment that concentration creates systemic risk. In my discussion, I focus on
three issues that the paper raises. First, it seems that welfare is lower in the
high banking concentration countries, so that the frequency of banking
crises may not be a good indicator of welfare. Second, it is hard to evaluate
the extent to which the paper can be used to argue that concentration in the
United States does not create systemic risk. Third, while it is clear that con-
centration does not increase the risk of crises, one has to be cautious about
concluding that it decreases them.
The sample includes sixty-nine countries. A large number of countries in
the sample are small and ﬁnancially underdeveloped. The authors measure
concentration by the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in the
country. In the sample, there is a strong negative correlation between real
GDP per capita and banking concentration. The highest value of the con-
centration index is 1. The sample has seven countries with a concentration
index of 1. They are all African countries. From 1980 through 1997, these
countries spend a total of eleven years in the banking crisis state. In con-
trast, the United States has a concentration index of 0.19 and spends
twelve years in the banking crisis state. The authors show that there results
hold without the African countries and without the United States. How-
ever, the comparison points to important issues when one attempts to eval-
uate the results of the paper. First, though banking concentration is not
associated with banking crises, it seems associated with ﬁnancial under-
development. Perhaps most of these countries would happily trade their
banking system for the U.S. banking system if the cost were to have a sav-
ings and loans crisis. Second, not all crises are alike. The U.S. savings and
loans crisis was assuredly expensive. However, did it really endanger the
U.S. banking system? Probably not.
232 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross LevineThere are not many banks in the world that come close to being similar
to the largest U.S. banks. These banks have activities throughout the
world. Their activities are quite diversiﬁed. They have extremely sophisti-
cated risk measurement and management organizations. Increasing con-
centration in the United States might just bring assets under the control of
the most eﬃcient banks. However, at the same time, one has to wonder
about whether such incredibly complex organizations are not more fragile
than simpler and more straightforward organizations. The Challenger
shuttle was brought down by an O-ring. Do we really have a good sense of
what the O-rings of a major bank are? The sample the authors consider
does not really help in answering that question. This it not a criticism of the
paper. It is just that this type of study is well suited at answering the ques-
tion of whether concentration leads to greater systemic risk for the median
country in the sample but not for countries where banks are fundamentally
diﬀerent from typical banks in the sample.
Most banks do not use derivatives. However, in the United States, most
of the notional amount of derivatives contracts held by banks is held by a
handful of banks. Speciﬁcally, at the end of the third quarter of 2005, the
notional amount of derivatives held by banks was $96.2 trillion, but 95 per-
cent of that amount was held by ﬁve U.S. banks.1 JP Morgan Chase alone
accounts for close to half the notional amount of derivatives held by U.S.
banks. There are good reasons why this concentration of derivatives hold-
ings could substantially worsen the impact of losses at major banks. Sup-
pose that JP Morgan Chase suﬀers a one-year-in-ﬁfty loss on its loan port-
folio. Would the problems posed by that loss be smaller or greater if it held
one fourth of its derivatives? There are reasons why the problems would 
be smaller with a smaller portfolio of derivatives. One would expect the
bank’s dealings with its counterparties in the derivatives market to become
substantially more complicated after such a large loss. Contracts wherein
JP Morgan has to put up additional collateral would impose demands on
the bank’s liquidity. More importantly, its ability to trade derivatives would
be impaired, which would adversely aﬀect its ability to hedge and to gen-
erate income. All of these developments would substantially worsen the
impact of the loss on its loss portfolio. Obviously, a crisis at JP Morgan
Chase that prevents it from functioning normally as a bank would have 
far-reaching implications compared to the S&L crisis. However, whether
banking concentration makes such a crisis more likely and whether it wors-
ens its impact cannot be learned from international comparisons—very
few other countries have the equivalent of JP Morgan Chase.
The authors attempt to understand why it is that concentration reduces
the risk of crises. I have two reservations with that exercise. First, while it
is clear that concentration does not worsen the risk of crises, it is less clear
that it reduces it. The authors use a dataset of yearly observations. The ob-
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1. See Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Bank derivatives report, third quarter of 2005.vious diﬃculty with such a sample is that concentration is highly autocor-
related. It seems likely that this autocorrelation leads to an overstatement
of the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on concentration in the logistic regres-
sions that predict whether a country is in the crisis state or not. Second, the
authors consider the impact on the coeﬃcient on concentration of adding
explanatory variables to the logistic regression. They ﬁnd that concentra-
tion ceases to be signiﬁcant when they add a variable corresponding to the
mean bank size of a country times an interactive variable that takes value
1 if the banks in the country cannot make foreign loans. In other words,
crises are more likely in countries where the banking system seems closed
and where banks are large. While the authors would like to interpret this
result as explaining the role of concentration, I am not convinced with that
view. All they seem to show is that they added an omitted variable in the re-
gression.
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Discussion Summary
Much of the general discussion was focused on alternative stories. Philipp
Hartmann suggested an alternative to a market-power story: Concentra-
tion increases the chance that a material portion of a nation’s banking sec-
tor will be treated as too-big-to-fail, and given the deﬁnition of the crisis
measure, this will reduce the measured likelihood of a crisis. Jan Krahnen
wondered whether measured concentration may be a proxy for country
size and about other measurement error, noting that the German banking
system is functionally highly concentrated even though it would not be
measured as such by the authors. Patricia Jackson observed that United
Kingdom experience has taught that, at the individual bank level, concen-
tration in the sense of a bank being locked into a single funding source, into
lending to a single industry, or into operating in a small geographic area is
a major factor in bank failure, but the paper does not include these types
of concentration.
Hashim Pesaran and Darrell Duﬃe expressed concern about the use of 
a logit model in a setting where dynamic relationships within the sample
may be material. Duﬃe suggested use of a Cox proportional hazard model
for the probability of moving into a crisis as a way of dealing with such con-
cerns. He also suggested examining the probability of moving out of a
crisis.
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